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Abstract
In 2019, Ireland declared a ‘Climate Emergency,’ receiving plaudits from across the political spectrum for doing so. Some
argued the country was experiencing an era of ‘new climate politics’: In 2017, Ireland had established the first Citizens’
Assembly on Climate, and in 2019 its Parliament debated a Climate Emergency Measures Bill, which was ground-breaking
in its proposal to ban offshore oil and gas exploration. Yet, despite majority support for this Bill in Parliament, the minority
Government blocked the legislation by refusing to grant a ‘MoneyMessage,’ a potential veto activated following indication
by an independent actor that a Bill would require the appropriation of public money. We introduce the concept of ‘policy
stifling’ to capture how theMoneyMessage was used to block the Climate Emergency Measures Bill. We conduct detailed
process-tracing analysis, building on elite semi-structured interviews with policy makers and campaigners involved in the
process. We argue that whilst the Government’s stifling undermined the new era of elite climate politics, it simultaneously
boosted an emerging grassroots climate politics movement with the potential for effecting more radical change in the
longer term.
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1. Introduction
Irelandhas the reputation of being a climate laggard (e.g.,
Little & Torney, 2017). Yet recent developments—such
as the Citizens’ Assemblies in 2017–2018 that discussed
how Ireland can become a climate leader, the adoption
of a Climate Action Plan in 2019 (Torney, 2020) and dec-
laration of a climate emergency on the 9th May 2019—
seemed to suggest a turning of the tide on climate action
during the minority government of 2016 to 2020. This
period also witnessed a growing climate movement in
Ireland, which along with some legislative progress on
climate change, seemed to show that a new era of cli-
mate politics had arrived. However, whilst there have
been steps forward, close analysis of technical legisla-
tive processes that led to the rejection of the Climate
Emergency Measures (CEM) Bill reveals that the claim
of a new era of elite climate politics may be premature,
with climate action falling short of the transformations
needed. The familiar trade-offs between short-term eco-
nomic interests and environmental ambition that have
long characterised climate politics in Ireland remain in
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place. In this article, we present evidence of pressure
being applied to an independent actor to facilitate the
vetoing of policy proposals that could advance the cli-
mate agenda, through the use of the Money Message,
which we describe in more detail below. We develop a
novel concept of ‘policy stifling’ to describe this type of
behaviour and suggest that decision-makers who engage
in policy stifling seek to depoliticise their actions, in order
to minimise wider political costs.
The next section outlines the operation of the Irish
political process and the nature and status of the Money
Message, before we develop and explain the concept
of ‘policy stifling,’ drawing from the literature on veto
points, policy dismantling and depoliticisation. We then
outline our process-tracing methodology, and data col-
lection for the period under investigation (2016–2020).
Fourth, we analyse how Ireland’s minority government
fluctuated in its policy positions towards the climate
emergency. Finally, we discuss our empirical findings and
offer some conclusions.
2. The Irish Political System and the ‘Money Message’
In Ireland, the Government, as the institution respon-
sible for the country’s economy and for proposing an
annual budget, would be placed in a challenging position
if it had no executive control to limit Bills with economic
implications. Thus, Article 17.2 of the Constitution of
Ireland states that the Dáil (parliamentary lower house)
may not pass or enact a law “for the appropriation of
revenue or other public moneys unless the purpose of
the appropriation shall have been recommended to Dáil
Éireann by a message from the Government signed by
the Taoiseach [Prime Minister of Ireland]” (Constitution
of Ireland, 2018). This message, signed by the Taoiseach,
is what has become known as a Money Message, and
is a traditional formal veto (see Kenny & Daly, 2019).
The government is entitled to exercise this veto if the leg-
islation is deemed to appropriate revenue or other pub-
lic moneys.
To become law, all Bills must pass through five stages
in each of the two legislative chambers: the Dáil and
the Seanad. If and when a Bill secures a majority at
the Second Stage of the five in the Dáil, the Ceann
Comhairle (Speaker of the Dáil), advised by the indepen-
dent parliamentary Bills Office, determines if a Money
Message is required. As in many legislatures, the Ceann
Comhairle is an elected parliamentarian who is expected
to “preside impartially” in the chamber (Houses of the
Oireachtas, n.d.). InMay 2019, theOireachtas Library and
Research Service published a Note on Private Members’
Bills (PMBs; Lynch & Lawlor, 2019), which listed 55 PMBs
within the 32nd Dáil that were deemed to require a
Money Message after reaching the Third Stage (in Select
Committee), having already secured amajority in theDáil.
A further 14 PMBs did not require a Money Message.
Traditionally, Irish governments have benefited from
parliamentary majorities, and therefore have not nor-
mally vetoed legislation by refusing to grant a Money
Message if one is required, because any Bill that reaches
this stage would already have the support of ministers.
In cases where legislation is initiated by backbench par-
liamentarians (Teachtaí Dála, henceforth TDs), and the
Bills Office and the Ceann Comhairle judge that a Money
Message is necessary, the government can use this pro-
cedure to block legislation—although it does not always
choose to do so. For example, in the case of the National
Famine Commemoration Day Bill 2017, proposed as a
PMB by Colm Brophy TD of the governing Fine Gael party,
a Money Message was granted in May 2018 (Houses of
theOireachtas, 2019b). In contrast, aMoneyMessage for
the Waste Reduction Bill 2017, proposed by Green Party
TDs Eamon Ryan and Catherine Martin, was not granted.
Our contention in this article is that the Irish
Government persuaded the supposedly independent
Ceann Comhairle that a potentially transformative CEM
Bill required aMoneyMessage, thereby reversing a previ-
ous decision that this was unnecessary. This enabledmin-
isters to ‘stifle’ the proposed legislation. In the following
section, we outline our concept of policy stifling, before
explaining our case selection in more detail in Section 4.
3. Policy Stifling
It is generally accepted in legislative studies that legis-
lation can be blocked during the agenda-setting stage,
whilst being discussed, or after being agreed. We review
each of these approaches, before proposing our own con-
cept of ‘policy stifling.’
First, policymakers may obstruct proposals before
they are even formally discussed, or voted upon,
through ‘non-decision-making.’ Bachrach and Baratz
(1962) labelled this behaviour the ‘second face of power’:
the ability of elites to set the agenda and thereby
avoid debating and taking an active decision in the
first place. Such behaviour can ensure that elites avoid
paying the political price for opposing legislation that
would have garnered popular support, as they do not
need to reveal their opposition publicly. Second, policy-
makers can actively block policy proposals using formal
veto powers granted to them in the legislative process
(Tsebelis, 1995). In order to do so, however, a proposal
must be submitted formally, in contrast to the principle
underpinning pre-emptive non-decision-making. Finally,
policy dismantling is the “cutting, diminution or removal
of existing policy” (Jordan, Bauer, & Green-Pedersen,
2013, p. 795), which typically applies to legislation that
has been adopted.
Whilst at first glance these approaches cover the
main stages of the policy cycle (proposal, adoption and
implementation), they overlook an important subset of
policies that have been proposed and received support
from the legislature but have yet to become law. During
this window, governments wishing to obstruct a Bill’s
passage may seek to create new veto points in a way
that means they are not punished by the electorate
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for potentially unpopular decisions. Such a scenario has
been neglected in the existing literature.
We propose that this behaviour is best captured
by our proposed concept of ‘policy stifling’: the cre-
ation of a new veto point via government lobbying of
an independent actor. Such stifling occurs once a Bill
has already received majority support within the lower
house. Moreover, we suggest that stifling is more likely
when an independent actor plays a critical role in the
policy adoption process, which is consistent with wider
studies on depoliticisation, namely “the process of plac-
ing at one remove [i.e., with a degree of separation]
the political character of decision-making” (Burnham,
2001, p. 128). The phenomenon is often pursued by
establishing arms-length bodies and procedural mech-
anisms that give independent actors (which are some-
times ‘neutral,’ and sometimes unelected) greater influ-
ence over public functions (see Flinders & Buller, 2006).
Sometimes viewed as a way to improve the legitimacy
of policymaking, depoliticisation as a governing strategy
has attracted much normative criticism on the basis that
it deflects blame and reduces democratic oversight and
accountability (Flinders & Wood, 2015). Subsequently,
others argued that focusing solely on the exercise of
state functions limits our understanding of what is
‘political’ (Beveridge, 2017) and both the narrow and
broader understandings have relevance for environmen-
tal policymaking.
This framework is clearly relevant for analysing the
era of climate politics. Key dimensions of climate policy,
such as energy and planning, are broadly technocratic,
as engineers, economists and bureaucrats tend to dom-
inate policy design and implementation (Healy & Barry,
2017), and expert bodies often play important roles in
decision-making. As Hajer (1995) notes, the politics of
environmental change have become narrowly focused
on such technical and administrative matters, squeez-
ing out broader political contestations (Mangat, Dalby,
& Paterson, 2018). However, as Healy and Barry (2017)
note, climate politics more broadly are “not simply a
technological or indeed a socio-technical matter” but
rather inherently contested, “characterised by issues of
power, distribution of and access to resources, political
economy, and so on, it can be described as a deeply polit-
ical struggle” (Healy & Barry, 2017, p. 452).
Our concept of policy stifling can contribute to wider
analyses of public policy and of how governments treat
policies that may command broad appeal, but which pol-
icymakers are nonetheless reluctant to introduce. Policy
stifling is distinct from non-decision-making, vetoing and
policy dismantling. First, a policy must be proposed in
order to be stifled so does not qualify as non-decision-
making. Second, a veto is typically defined as the exer-
cise of a formal executive power to reject a proposal at
a clearly indicated stage in the legislative process. In pol-
icy stifling, the government does not (yet) possess a for-
mal veto, and it therefore lobbies actors to create one.
Policy dismantling also differs from stifling, because it
refers to theweakening or removal of legislation that has
already been implemented. To summarise, we suggest
that policy stifling is a distinct political phenomenon that
occurs when a government successfully lobbies an inde-
pendent actor to create a new formal veto point, which
the government then employs to block a policy proposal.
We now turn to explain our choice of case study method
and the case itself, the Irish CEM Bill.
4. Methods, Data, and Case Selection and Description
4.1. Methods and Data
This article employs a qualitative, process-tracing
approach. Process tracing is a “research method for
tracing causal mechanisms using detailed, within-case
empirical analysis of how a causal mechanism operated
in real-world cases” (Beach & Brun Pedersen, 2019, p.
1). In this article, we analyse critically the case of the
CEM Bill, and how it came to be vetoed despite secur-
ing a majority in the Dáil. Process tracing is used to
explain change within cases, and so our case section is
structured chronologically, before examining key themes
in the discussion. While process tracing the CEM Bill
is our primary focus, we also trace the development
of other climate policies during 2016–2020, to enable
us to reflect upon the development of an era of ‘new
climate politics’ in the discussion, and to review the
extent to which the government was willing to act on
climate change in other areas. To conduct our analysis,
we examined policy documents, legislation, speeches
and newspaper articles from the period. We also held
eight semi-structured elite interviews with relevant fig-
ures in October 2019 and in May 2020 (see Table 1; ref-
erenced as INT1 to INT8). The interviewees included an
Irish MEP’s assistant, an Irish environmental campaigner,
two Irish civil servants, three environmental NGO volun-
teers, a Government Minister, a parliamentary assistant,
and a journalist. The interviews were each recorded and
then transcribed in full, before being coded using an iter-
ative, inductive codebook. This coding process identified
23 themes thatwere discussedduring the interviews, not
all of which were directly relevant to our investigation.
4.2. Case Selection and Description
We selected the Republic of Ireland as a case due to
its Janus-faced policy stances on ‘climate emergency’
legislation. The existing literature on Irish environmen-
tal policy focuses on Ireland’s status as a laggard (Little
& Torney, 2017) and notes how vigorous lobbying by
business and farming groups hindered the development
of more ambitious climate policy between 2007–2016
(Torney, 2017; Torney & O’Gorman, 2019). To date,
there has been limited academic examination of cli-
mate governance under theminority 2016–2020 govern-
ment or the development of ‘new climate politics’ in
response to widespread efforts to address the climate
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Table 1. Interview list.
Code Date Interviewee
INT1 23/10/2019 Irish MEP’s assistant
INT2 24/10/2019 Irish environmental campaigner
INT3 24/10/2019 Irish civil servant
INT4 29/10/2019 Three Environmental NGO volunteers
INT5 29/10/2019 Irish civil servant
INT6 25/10/2019 Government Minister
INT7 06/05/2020 Parliamentary assistant
INT8 06/05/2020 Journalist
emergency. Lijphart (1999) placed Ireland between a
majoritarian and consensual democracy in his classifica-
tion, but the Republic has becomemore consensual over
time, with the number of one-party cabinets falling over
the decades (Bulsara & Kissane, 2009). Ireland’s Single
Transferable Vote electoral system has resulted in an
increasingly wide range of parties within the Dáil.
The period under investigation ran from 26th
February 2016 to 8th February 2020, covering the full
term of Ireland’s minority government, in which the
lowest ever number of seats were returned for tradi-
tional parties, and includes the rise of the ‘climate emer-
gency’ movement and Fridays for Future strike campaign.
In 2016, an electoral swing away from the tradition-
ally dominant two main parties resulted in a coalition
government of the centre-right Fine Gael party with
Independent TDs, relying on ‘confidence and supply’ sup-
port from the other traditionally dominant party, Fianna
Fáil. This period clearly had the potential to herald a
‘new politics’ in which non-government TDs could exer-
cise much greater legislative influence than previously,
and governance innovations such as Citizens’ Assemblies
provided new platforms for political debate (Devaney,
Torney, Brereton, & Coleman, 2020). This ‘new politics’
has become more apparent since 2011, and has been
defined to date by growing levels of support for Sinn Fein,
as well as for independent candidates and other, mainly
left-of-centre, smaller parties, that focused specifically
on green issues (Kavanagh, 2015, p. 79). Overall, there
was a narrative of change and breaking new ground for
democracy in Ireland: “The dawn of this [2016–2020]
Dáil was heralded by talk of reform. Opposition TDs
would be listened to. Their ideas wouldmake it into legis-
lation. And those laws would be passed by compromise”
(Doyle, 2018).
Finally, for greater understanding of the role of
bottom-up movements in agitating for political change,
Ireland is an interesting context to study. Comparatively,
Irish citizens have one of the highest levels of access
to politicians, due to Ireland’s relatively small size, the
path dependent practices of contact and interactionwith
politicians such as a tradition of ‘weekly clinics,’ and a
voting system that incentivises politicians to be gener-
ally responsive to those in their constituencies. Indeed,
in 2016, 15.8% of citizens were found to have contacted
their TDs in the preceding year period, whilst 87% of
thosewere contacted during the 2016 election campaign
(Farrell, Gallagher, & Barrett, 2018, p. 198). The partic-
ularities of the Irish system, including its Proportional
Representation Single Transferable Vote system, have
been suggested to encourage clientelism, which is seen
as a hurdle to progress as it leads politicians to focus
on their own constituencies rather than national issues
(see Gallagher, 2019). However, the responsiveness of
Irish politicians to their constituents should mean that
if a desire for action on the climate emerges within the
electorate, this can be communicated to political rep-
resentatives relatively easily and could result in more
ambitious climate policy. So, in this context, the coun-
try exhibits two factors that could facilitate progress in
climate policy: a short chain of contact between politi-
cians and citizens (including climate movements), and
the emergence of a ‘new politics’ due to a minority gov-
ernment, dynamic party constellations and governance
innovations. Given these favourable conditions, examin-
ing Ireland offers insights into the scope and emergence
of a new climate politics to date, and potential lessons
for the future.
5. Case Study: Stifling the Climate Emergency
Measures Bill
In 2017, Ireland held its first Citizens’ Assembly on
how to make the country a global leader on climate
action (Devaney et al., 2020), following the successes
of Citizens’ Assemblies in addressing other contested
issues (INT5). Oneoutcomeof the Citizens’ Assemblywas
the formation of a new parliamentary committee, the
‘Joint Oireachtas (‘legislature’) Committee on Climate
Action,’ (known as JOCCA) comprising TDs from six par-
ties plus two Independent TDs, to consider the citi-
zens’ recommendations. Eight days after the UK parlia-
ment’s declaration of a climate emergency on 1st May
2019, Ireland followed suit. The declaration came via
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an eight-word amendment moved by the Green Party,
added to a motion endorsing a JOCCA report already
passing through the Oireachtas. With only six of 160 TDs
present in the House when the declaration was debated
and passed, Green Party leader Eamon Ryan acknowl-
edged its potentially limited and purely symbolic nature,
stating that “declaring an emergency means absolutely
nothing unless there is action to back it up” (Climate
Emergency Declaration, n.d.). The declaration did not
contain substantive provisions or information about how
it would be implemented or enforced, and lacked the
necessary resources needed for it to make a significant
structural change.
Crucially, at the same time as the declaration,
another proposal, the CEM Bill, was passing through the
parliament. This Bill did contain specific provisions that
could deliver meaningful climate mitigation, as it explic-
itly prohibited the government from granting new fossil
fuel extraction licences. Notably, according to one of our
interviewees (INT2), the Bill was pursued because of the
‘newpolitics’ context: “We live in thismagical time of hav-
ing a minority government, so you can still pass legisla-
tion when you are in the opposition….So this is a tremen-
dously exciting thing for our campaign group.”
Bríd Smith TD, of the Solidarity-People Before Profit
party, introduced the CEM Bill on the 15th November
2017. The Bill was an amendment to the Petroleum and
OtherMinerals Development Bill, stating that, “while the
climate emergency still exists, no new licenses shall be
issued from this country for oil and gas,” thus contain-
ing policy proposals that would address the problem in
question and could be enforced relatively easily. On 30th
January 2018, a revised andmore detailed version of the
Bill was introduced to the Dáil. Stop Climate Chaos, a
coalition of over 30 civil society organisations, mobilised
around the Bill, designing an email tool for people to
contact their TDs directly. Campaigners focused on lob-
bying non-government TDs in order to take advantage
of the minority government context. Fianna Fail, the
second largest party in the Dáil, which propped up the
Government in a confidence-and-supply arrangement,
took a ‘landmark position,’ coming out in support of the
Bill (O’Sullivan, 2018). On the 8th February 2018, with
the support of Independent TDs and opposition parties,
the Bill was supported by 78 TDs voting in favour at
the Second Stage, while 48 voted against (Houses of the
Oireachtas, 2018a; Lee, 2018).
In line with standard practice, the politically inde-
pendent Bills Office reviewed the Bill to determine if
it required a Money Message. In this case, as the Bill
was judged to have no cost implications nor to need
the appropriation of public funds, the Bills Office appar-
ently stated that a Money Message was unnecessary
(Crosson, 2019a). Speaking later on the matter, the Chair
of the Joint Oireachtas Committee on Communications,
Climate Action and Environment, Hildegarde Naughton
of the governing Fine Gael party, confirmed this interpre-
tation when she stated:
I have a letter here from the Bills Office dated
26 February 2018, addressed to the then clerk to
the committee, to the effect that this Bill does not
require a money message, financial resolution or
European Central Bank, ECB, consultation. (Houses of
the Oireachtas, 2019a)
Thus, by March 2019, the Bill had received majority sup-
port in the Dáil on two occasions. The second time it
was endorsed in the Dáil was to progress it after a tied
vote in the Joint Oireachtas Committee. The tied vote in
December 2018 had resulted in a ‘procedural cul-de-sac’
for the Bill as described by Bríd Smith TD, with the Leader
of the Green Party, Eamon Ryan TD, questioning whether
it would be “another environmental Bill which Fine Gael
have been able to kill with procedural glue” (Sargent,
2018). After a period in ‘limbo,’ on 28th March 2019,
Smith forwarded a motion in the Dáil that would allow
the Bill to progress to select committee stage, whilst
citizen groups protested outside the Dáil in support of
the Bill (Crosson, 2019b). The vote resulted in the Bill
being allowed to progress, with Smith including Not
Here, Not Anywhere, Stop Climate Chaos, Trocáire (the
overseas development agency of the Catholic Church in
Ireland), and Friends of the Earth Ireland, in her thanks
to those who supported the Bill (Crosson, 2019b). Thus,
the Bill had two supportive votes in parliament, had been
deemed not to need a Money Message, and was sched-
uled for Select Committee (‘Third’) Stage three months
later (People Before Profit, 2019a).
Despite earlier progress, in May 2019, Seán Canney
TD, Minister for Natural Resources, Community Affairs
and Digital Development, wrote a letter to the Ceann
Comhairle requesting further consideration of the
money message decision (Houses of the Oireachtas,
2019a). He argued that the legislation might open the
government up to legal costs, and result in the govern-
ment losing revenue from fossil fuel drilling licences, and
that this money could be used to fund the green tran-
sition (Houses of the Oireachtas, 2019a). Despite the
Ceann Comhairle and Bills Office being independent of
the government, and despite the fact that the usual tim-
ing for deciding whether aMoneyMessage was required
had passed, the Ceann Comhairle reversed the previous
decision and decided that a Money Message was neces-
sary for the Bill. Highlighting the paradox behind declar-
ing a Climate Emergency but opposing a Bill that had
climate implications, Deputy Smith (also a member of
the Committee on Communications, Climate Action and
Environment) asked the government:
What, if anything, does a climate emergency mean if
it is not that we have to take cognisance of the level
of CO2 in the atmosphere? Does that not constitute
the basis of an emergency? We have just declared
such an emergency in Dáil Éirean. (Houses of the
Oireachtas, 2019a)
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However, the Government did not grant the Money
Message. On the 4th July 2019, Minister for Com-
munications, Climate Action and Environment Richard
Bruton wrote to Smith to explain why the Government
would not grant the Bill a Money Message. Bruton
argued that the legislation would not make any contribu-
tion to delivering Ireland’s carbon reduction targets, but
simply necessitate the importation of fossil fuels instead
(McCrave, 2019). Furthermore, the Bill was said to ignore
“the potential financial implications of the proposal,” and
listed other targets such as retrofitting 500,000 buildings,
which had “been selected based on those choices which
are the least cost to society as a whole” (McCrave, 2019).
Thus, the government stifled the passage of a Bill that
had already obtained majority support in the legislature,
by encouraging an independent actor to create a veto
point that it could then employ. In the words of our inter-
viewees, “it was just clearly…a last ditched attempt to kill
the Bill” (INT8). The interviewee went on to comment
on the obscure way in which the Money Message was
employed, arguing that “arguments used by the govern-
mentwere dubious at best” (INT8),with another intervie-
wee adding, “they were making the argument that this
piece of legislation which simply says ‘don’t grant any
new licenses’ impacts the budget. Which I believe is spu-
rious, which is unfair” (INT2).
In response to this policy stifling, on the 5th
November 2019, the Solidarity-People Before Profit
party sought to propose in the Dáil that the Standing
Orders be changed, such that Bills that had been blocked
by the government using the Money Message could pro-
ceed (Finn, 2019; People Before Profit, 2019b). The party
also proposed that the Government could no longer
block Bills because of potential incidental expenses or
indirect costs (People Before Profit, 2019b). However,
the Ceann Comhairle refused to allow the party to use
its Private Members’ time to do so, citing concerns
about its constitutionality (Finn, 2019). Following much
parliamentary controversy over the “undemocratic” use
of the Money Message (Finn, 2019), several delays, a
High Court challenge (McConnell, 2019) and a General
Election on the 8th February 2020, the CEM Bill lapsed
with the dissolution of the 32nd Dáil and Seanad.
Thus, a Bill that had achieved a parliamentary major-
ity was successfully stifled, while the Climate Emergency
Declaration remained as a clarion of the urgency of cli-
mate change.
It is worth noting, of course, that the CEM Bill was
not the only climate measure discussed in the period
under study. In June 2019, the Government passed a
Climate Action Plan comprising 183 actions, assessed on
a quarterly basis. Our interviewees varied in their per-
ceptions of the Plan, from describing it as “really signif-
icant. That is the blueprint” (INT3) and “covering every
segment of public, enterprise and private life” (INT6), to
being “watered down and…discarding the citizens’ rec-
ommendations” (INT2). Environmental and human rights
groups levelled a “devastating critique” of the Plan, with
more than 30 of these organisations “describing it as
lacking detail, ambition and urgency” (O’Doherty, 2019).
The CEMBill, however, received broad support fromenvi-
ronmentalists. Thus, the CEM Bill, and the wider era of
supposed ‘new politics’ during the 32nd Dáil, is a useful
case to analyse in order to establish whether a new cli-
mate politics is emerging, bolstered by grassroots calls
for wide reaching transformative change.
6. Discussion
The 32nd Dáil saw several hallmarks of an era of ‘new
politics,’ through the mobilisation of new coalitions and
parliamentary tactics, but also the increased significance
of the Money Message, which became a vehicle through
which the government could halt the progress of climate
politics. The CEM Bill had been passed twice by the Dáil:
once following its introduction and again to progress the
Bill after a tied vote in the Joint Oireachtas Committee
on Communications, Climate Action and Environment.
Nevertheless, the Government was able to delay, block
and finally stifle its progress, through its encouragement
of the Ceann Comhairle to employ the Money Message.
Given that political forces were able to act in this way,
claims that a new climate politics were emerging in
Ireland seemed premature—at least at the elite level.
Our contribution of the concept of policy stifling
enables greater analytical leverage in understanding
veto theory, and the steps governments may take to
block legislation they do not support. Building on the
existing literature, we outlined how the Irish govern-
ment attempted to depoliticise its highly political deci-
sion on the CEM Bill, by persuading the independent
Ceann Comhairle that the legislation required a Money
Message after all. That the Bill would put pressure on
the public financeswas not abundantly clear, and indeed,
the initial decision that it did not need aMoneyMessage
makes the final decision that it (a) did require one
and (b) would not receive one, all the more puzzling.
What is clear, however, is that the government appeared
reluctant to ban oil and gas drilling and would there-
fore be keen to prevent the Bill becoming law. Though
understanding ultimate motivations is not possible, the
Government did cite several financial reasons for its deci-
sion, including loss of revenue from licenses, the risk
of legal action (O’Sullivan & Horgan-Jones, 2019), the
availability of less costly approaches via its own Climate
Action Plan and the prospect that the monies from fossil
fuel extraction could be used to fund the green transition.
By framing its decision in such financial terms, we can
see how the government was able to argue that the Bill
should require a Money Message and therefore enable
it to stifle the legislation.
This case provides new insights for the concept of
policy stifling. First, previous studies of similar practices
focus on official channels for vetoing proposals (Tsebelis,
1995), or dismantling legislation after it has been imple-
mented (Bauer & Knill, 2012). We introduce the concept
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of policy stifling to this mix by showing how govern-
ments can employ mechanisms to depoliticise decisions
that undermine legislative proposals and thereby try to
reduce the political costs that explicitly blocking legisla-
tion could incur. Second, while the usage of the Money
Message was low-profile and unfamiliar for much of the
32nd Dáil, its extensive usage over time led to a court
case related to seeking to reduce its use. By the time
of the case in November 2019, the Money Message
had become high-profile, obtaining detailed coverage
in national newspapers (Finn, 2019). To be explicit: in
minority government contexts, it is the decision of the
Ceann Comhairle and recommendation of the Bills Office
as to whether a PMB requires a Money Message that
determines whether the government can veto a Bill, or
is powerless to stop its progression. Stifling bills by lob-
bying such independent actors may be ‘low visibility’ at
first usage, but employing it frequently is likely to garner
more high-profile attention, particularly when applied to
salient policy proposals.
Climate emergency declarations could herald an era
of new climate politics, with governments acknowledg-
ing the severity of the climate crisis and pursuing ambi-
tious action. However, our analysis shows the need to
scrutinise parallel policy developments on the ground,
lest climate emergency declarations serve as greenwash-
ing that obscures climate action realities. Climate emer-
gency declarations, though increasingly welcomed, do
not automatically translate to further action. The after-
math of the Climate Emergency Declaration saw contin-
ued and increasing citizen mobilisation around the cli-
mate issue, calling for action from government. Indeed,
despite stifling the Bill, the Government later moved
to ban offshore oil drilling, announced by the then
Taoiseach Leo Varadkar at the 2019 UN Climate Action
Summit. Further action on climate change may be pred-
icated on the development of anti-fossil fuel norms
(Green, 2018), and although the Bill was stifled, sub-
sequent events seem to support the further develop-
ment of grassroots anti-fossil fuel norms in Ireland dur-
ing the timeframe analysed. Thus, the new politics may
yet establish new norms that galvanise new policy coali-
tions, which in turn may hold even stronger sway in the
event of continued minority government and increasing
shifts in Irish electoral behaviour away from the tradi-
tional parties. Indeed, shortly before finalising this article
in spring 2021, the grand coalition government moved
to extend the ban on new offshore drilling to cover gas
as well as oil. This new ban was not inevitable, and the
citizens’ movements agitating for climate action, particu-
larly those seeking to develop anti-fossil fuel norms, such
as Not Here, Not Anywhere, have been a key part in such
developments. Despite the Government’s initial attempt
to depoliticise the decision on offshore drilling, there-
fore, social movements worked to (re)politicise the issue.
Indeed, the role of social movements, and the poten-
tial impact of a ‘new grassroots climate politics’ should
not be underestimated. Bríd Smith acknowledged the
“tremendous amount of work with Solidarity-People
Before Profit in the lead-up to the production and presen-
tation of the Bill” provided by non-governmental organ-
isations (Houses of the Oireachtas, 2018b)—pointing to
the role of wider social mobilisation on climate change in
the Bill’s development. Even though the Bill was stifled
by the government, continued mobilisation by citizens
solidified its legacy in concrete action. As one intervie-
wee put it: “They killed the Bill, they were coming under
huge pressure about that, it wasn’t a good look for them,
and then [Taoiseach] Varadkar made an announcement
over in NewYork that hewas going to ban oil exploration”
(INT8). Furthermore, the spread of anti-fossil-fuel norms,
whichwere strengthened by the CEMBill, provides fertile
grounds for new climate politics.
Overall, Ireland witnessed a stifling of the type of cli-
mate policy that would constitute a new climate politics
approach from government, namely to implement initia-
tives thatwould support the radical changes necessary to
address the climate emergency. Yet, increasingly active
climate movements, and the development of anti-fossil-
fuel norms through an ambitious policy proposal arising
out of and supported by citizen mobilisations, suggest
that despite this stifling at government level, a new grass-
roots climate politics may yet have potential to achieve
transformative change.
7. Conclusion
Empirically, we found that Ireland’s ‘new politics,’ which
seemed to provide the basis for progress on climate
issues at the elite level, was stifled by a government
that wanted to proceed at a slower pace. The Climate
Emergency Declaration did not prevent this stifling and
nor did it encourage rapid climate action, which should
be a cautionary tale for supporters of more progressive
environmental policy. A key factor was the Government’s
success in lobbying an independent and depoliticised
actor to help it block the legislation. However, while
the CEM Bill did not pass, its proposals, the Declaration,
along with the citizen movements associated with these,
may yet have created new norms—alongside new coali-
tions of actors—for more substantive policies in the
future. We would welcome further research into how
these fluid politics shape policy across different sectors
in Ireland, as well as how the Irish government has
employed the Money Message as a veto on other poli-
cies not explored here. Indeed, the initial stifling of a
ban on offshore oil and gas drilling, followed by the gov-
ernment’s decisions to ban oil (and subsequently gas)
drilling in the following legislative period, collectively
offer a fruitful avenue of research for examining the
development of anti-fossil fuel norms and social move-
ments in repoliticising climate issues.
More broadly, we encourage scholars to inves-
tigate further the ways in which governments may
engage in policy stifling, and which jurisdiction-specific
mechanisms and procedures might enable policymakers
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to try to depoliticise potentially unpopular decisions.
Depending on the extent to which certain institutions
can operate independently of the executive, these could
include central banks, government agencies, scientific or
advisory bodies, and (in less liberal democratic contexts)
the courts. In particular, it would be useful to exam-
ine whether and how policy stifling operates in paral-
lel with initiatives (such as climate emergency declara-
tions) in other contexts. Our introduction of the concept
of policy stifling captures the behaviour of politicians
who wish to be seen to be acting on something, but
are unwilling to expend political or financial capital, or
perhaps simply do not wish to see meaningful change.
Policy stifling is an important new conceptual tool for
analysing contexts where (re)politicised action on cli-
mate change is increasingly urgent for achieving systemic
shifts. Further research should also analyse whether and
how policy stifling sits alongside other governmental
strategies that aim toweaken or remove existing policies,
such as agenda-setting, vetoing and dismantling legisla-
tion. Such studies will provide a fuller picture of how pol-
icymakers prevent the adoption and implementation of
legislation that they oppose.
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